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ABSTRACT
This paper reports the results of a survey of 1,976
individuals regarding their opinions on TLS inspection, a
controversial technique that can be used for both
benevolent and malicious purposes. Responses indicate
that participants hold nuanced opinions on security and
privacy trade-offs, with most recognizing legitimate uses
for the practice, but also concerned about threats from
hackers or government surveillance. There is strong
support for notification and consent when a system is
intercepting their encrypted traffic, although this support
varies depending on the situation. A significant concern
about malicious uses of TLS inspection is identity theft,
and many would react negatively and some would change
their behavior if they discovered inspection occurring
without their knowledge. We also find that a small but
significant number of participants are jaded by the current
state of affairs and have lost any expectation of privacy.
1. INTRODUCTION
In early 2013, one of the authors received an email from a
former student who expressed serious concerns after
becoming aware that his employer was inspecting its
employees’ encrypted Internet traffic in order to protect the
network from attackers. Though he was himself employed
in the computer security industry, he expressed surprise
and anger that this could happen, and also mentioned his
serious concerns about the potential for employees to
disclose personal information without being aware that
their data was visible to their employer. He questioned
whether this practice was legal and whether it was ethical
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to do this without notifying employees in advance.
In fact, it is common practice for companies to inspect
employees’ encrypted traffic to filter malware and viruses,
prevent the leak of intellectual property, and block harmful
websites [2, 25, 20]. This inspection is usually
accomplished with a network device that acts as a
TLS/SSL proxy, sitting in the middle of the
communication between a browser and web server where it
can intercept, decrypt, inspect, then re-encrypt and
forward on the user’s traffic to its original destination.
This is all accomplished without any visible notification to
the user that their encrypted traffic is being inspected.
While security experts overwhelmingly view the inspection
of encrypted traffic by attackers and governments as
undesirable, the practice of businesses and organizations
inspecting their own encrypted traffic in order to secure
their own network and intellectual property is more
controversial. Many experts are alarmed by any use of a
TLS proxy because it is deceptive; users’ browsers continue
to inform them they have a secure connection to the server,
even though this is not the case. Most research in the
literature treats all TLS proxies as undesirable and actively
tries to prevent their use [4]. Still, a smaller number of
researchers are investigating how the malicious uses can be
prevented while still allowing for benevolent use of
encrypted traffic inspection by businesses and
organizations [17, 14].
While the opinions of businesses and security experts
regarding the inspection of encrypted traffic are known, no
prior work has measured general (i.e., non-expert) user
attitudes and preferences toward the inspection of
encrypted traffic. To better understand users’ perspectives
on this issue, we surveyed 1,976 people across two surveys
regarding their opinions of TLS proxies and their use in
inspecting encrypted traffic.1 The results of the first survey
of 1,049 individuals showed a surprising willingness by
participants to accept the inspection of encrypted traffic,
provided they are first notified. Based on the results of the
first survey, we conducted a second survey of 927
individuals to further explore user attitudes towards
inspection of encrypted traffic in specific situations.
Our contributions from these surveys include the following
insights:
1The full data from both surveys is available at https://
soups2016.isrl.byu.edu/.
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• User opinions toward TLS proxies and the inspection
of encrypted traffic are nuanced. Many express
concerns about privacy and identity theft from
hackers (75.8%) or government surveillance (70.9%).
Yet there is broad, general acceptance of TLS proxies
when used by employers, schools, etc (71.7%).
• Most participants indicated support for the inspection
of encrypted traffic as long as they were first notified
of it (90.7%). Likewise, participants indicated strong
support for legislation requiring notification or consent
(83.2%).
• When asked about specific situations in which TLS
proxies might be used (e.g., at work, at school, at a
cafe´, or at home), support for TLS proxies ranges
from 65% to 90% of participants (including those
who want notification or consent). Support for
inspection of encrypted traffic without notification or
consent is strongest at elementary schools (45.9%)
and at businesses when employees are using
company-provided computers (47.9%). Participants
generally favor consent in cases when they feel in
control (at home, free WiFi, their own device at
work) versus notification when an organization is in
control (public library, school, company computer).
In nearly all the scenarios we posed, only a small
minority of the participants indicated that using TLS
proxies is not acceptable. The one exception is
government surveillance, in which case 47.5% say
that this is not acceptable.
• Many users would have a negative opinion if they
discovered that the owner of their network used a
TLS proxy without prior notification and/or consent
(60.8%), though for some (34.2%) it would depend on
who the owner was and how they were using the
technology. Some would change their behavior on the
network, either discontinuing to use it (17.2%) or
changing which sites they visited (6%).
• We identify personas based on participants’ responses
regarding TLS proxies: pragmatic (76.5%), privacy
fundamentalist (17.0%), jaded (5.0%), and
unconcerned (1.0%). Jaded participants are
interesting in that their opinions regarding privacy
and security align with the privacy fundamentalist
persona, but their practices align with the
unconcerned persona. This dichotomy stems from the
fact that these users feel that regardless of what steps
they take, they are powerless to prevent compromise
of their online information, and so choose to not do
anything to protect themselves.
While several of our findings might seem intuitive, it is
important to ground intuitions in data, and this paper
provides the first survey of user opinions on this topic. In
addition, participants showed a high level of engagement in
the survey, notwithstanding the complexity of the topic.
Many users shared in-depth analysis of trade-offs in open
responses, demonstrating that they care deeply about this
issue. User attitudes toward TLS proxies provide an
important data point along the spectrum of discussion that
is currently taking place regarding who should have access
to encrypted information.
2. BACKGROUND
The focus of our surveys is on user attitudes towards the
inspection of encrypted traffic (i.e., HTTPS), specifically
with the use of TLS proxies. In this section we provide
technical details regarding TLS proxies. We also discuss
real-world examples of how TLS proxies are used. Finally,
we present related work on measuring user sentiment
towards online privacy.
2.1 TLS Proxies
When a web browser attempts to validate the identity of a
website, it relies on certificate authorities (CAs) that
digitally sign certificates vouching for the identity of
servers. Web browsers authenticate a site by validating a
chain of trust from the site’s certificate back to one of a set
of trusted root certificates. These certificates comprise the
root store and are typically bundled with the operating
system or browser.
This validation system is currently being co-opted by the
use of TLS proxies that act as a man-in-the-middle (MitM)
for TLS connections. A TLS proxy can issue a substitute
certificate for any site the user visits, so that the user
establishes an encrypted connection to the proxy rather
than the desired web site. The proxy can then decrypt and
monitor or modify all user traffic, before passing it along
via a second encrypted channel to the desired web site. For
example, when a user attempts to create a secure
connection to Amazon by requesting Amazon’s certificate,
the proxy intercepts this request, generates a certificate for
Amazon, and sends this substitute certificate back to the
user’s machine. The user’s machine will then create a
secure connection to the proxy (instead of Amazon) and
send all of its data to the proxy, which has full access to it
before forwarding it on to Amazon’s servers.
TLS proxies can be used for both benevolent and malicious
purposes. Some companies use TLS proxies to filter
malware and viruses, prevent the leak of company secrets
and intellectual property, block harmful websites, or catch
malicious insiders. However, less scrupulous companies,
government agencies, crime organizations, and others may
also use proxies to steal a user’s sensitive data, conduct
surveillance, or commit identity theft. Currently, browsers
and users have no method for distinguishing between
benevolent and malicious TLS proxies, and the user is
entirely unaware that an organization or attacker is
intercepting encrypted traffic. Even when a TLS proxy is
present, the browsers displays a reassuring lock icon that
could mislead users to assume they are communicating
securely with the website.
To avoid browser warnings that self-signed substitute
certificates would trigger, TLS proxies generate substitute
certificates signed by a CA that the user’s machine trusts.
This can be done in several ways:
• Purchasing an intermediate certificate authority
certificate.
• Installing a new trusted root certificate on the user’s
machine. This can be done either by businesses (e.g.,
custom system image, manual installation, enterprise
PKI system) or by malware.
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• Including the certificate on a device’s root store when
it is manufactured. Nokia was recently found to be
using TLS proxies on mobile devices [18] and Lenovo
has pre-installed software using a TLS proxy on its
laptops [21].
• Controlling a root certificate authority. Some
governments are in this position, and evidence
suggests that even when governments do not own the
root they can coerce authorities into granting them
certificates for domains they do not own [15, 23].
• Stealing existing root and intermediate certificate
authority certificates [15, 7].
2.2 Real-world Examples
There are a variety of real-world scenarios, ranging from
suspicious to malicious, where inspection of encrypted traffic
is documented as having occurred.
Reports have notified the public that both Nokia and
Lenovo used TLS proxies to decrypt customer (not
employee) traffic for reasons other than security. Nokia
decrypted cell phone data, allegedly to improve
performance on their cellular network [18]. Some Lenovo
laptops came with third party software that inserted ads
into encrypted data [21]. Weaknesses in the adware
implementation left users vulnerable to attack from
malicious outsiders. Public outcry caused both companies
to stop accessing encrypted traffic.
Government surveillance has been reported to use similar
methods [24]. A report from 2011 showed that Iran
monitored 300,000 citizens online using a stolen certificate
from Diginotar, a company that is trusted to certify
legitimate websites [7].
Two recent measurement studies show that TLS proxies
account for about 1 in 250 encrypted connections on the
web [10, 19]. The vast majority of these monitored
connections are for benevolent purposes, but a small
percentage appear to be adware, grayware, and otherwise
suspicious activity.
The TLS proxy capability is essentially a backdoor into the
current web authentication system. This backdoor has
benevolent uses to strengthen the security of users and
organizations, and a majority of users support their use.
As with any backdoor, it’s very existence increases the
attack surface that can be exploited by attackers. For
example, a recent study of client-side TLS proxies used in
personal firewalls and parental filters discovered
implementation flaws in a number of products that open
the user to attack and weaken their security [5].
2.3 Related Work
There have been prior studies that survey user’s attitudes
about their online security and privacy. Still, no prior
study has looked specifically at user attitudes toward the
inspection of encrypted traffic.
McDonald and Cranor [16] used interviews and a survey to
explore user’s knowledge and perception of online behavioral
advertising practices. They discuss the potential chilling
effect of these practices based on 40% of the users that self-
reported they would change their behavior if they learned
advertisers were collecting data. Similarly, users reported
in our survey that they would change their behavior if they
learned that their encrypted data was being inspected.
Ur et al. [27] also studied user opinions about online
behavioral advertising by conducting 48 semi-structured
interviews with non-technical users. Similar to our work,
they found users had nuanced opinions about the trade-offs
for a technology that was both useful and privacy invasive.
They determined that users were not receiving effective
notice and choice mechanisms. Our surveys reveal a strong
desire for notification and choice regarding the inspection
of encrypted traffic.
Shay et al. [22] surveyed users via Amazon Mechanical
Turk about their attitudes and experiences with
compromised email or social networking sites. They found
that many respondents gave high quality responses to open
response questions and discussed implications for security
mechanism designers. Likewise, our work has significance
for the designers of mechanisms to inspect encrypted
traffic.
Anton et al. [1] surveyed users in 2008 to see if their
attitudes on privacy concerns had changed from the same
survey administered in 2002. They found that the top
three concerns of U.S. users were information transfer,
notice/awareness, and information storage. While the top
three concerns had not changed, their level of concern had
risen. The top three concerns for European users were the
same but in a different order; notice/awareness came in
third place. Concerns for notice/awareness are important
to both groups, and was a prominent factor in our surveys.
Woodruff et al. [29] examined how well users’ classification
by the Westin Privacy Segmentation Index predicted their
actual behavior. They found that although many
participants were classified as privacy fundamentalists,
their actions in hypothetical situations were not consistent
with this classification. Similarly, while we group
participants into personas with names similar to the
Westin categories, we do so by looking at how participants
indicate they would react to hypothetical situations and
not using any of Westin’s several privacy indexes.
3. FIRST SURVEY – METHODOLOGY
In February 2014, we conducted the first online survey
using the Amazon Mechanical Turk (MTurk)
crowdsourcing service. We gathered responses on
Wednesday, February 12, 2014 between 7:50 AM and 5:22
PM (PST). Each participant could take the survey once
and received $1 USD as compensation upon completing the
survey. In total 1,262 people completed the online survey.
The survey was approved by our Institutional Review
Board and is contained in Appendix A.
3.1 Instructing Participants
Before conducting this survey, we felt it was unlikely that
most people would be aware of TLS proxies (an assumption
that was upheld by our results). This presented a dilemma:
either we would need to only survey individuals who were
already aware of TLS proxies or we would need to instruct
participants about TLS proxies. Both of these options have
significant drawbacks. Limiting the survey to individuals
with pre-existing knowledge regarding TLS proxies would
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likely limit us to participants with highly technical
backgrounds, thus failing to gather information about
broader opinions related to the inspection of encrypted
traffic. On the other hand, instructing participants on TLS
proxies has the risk of unintentionally biasing them one
way or another, and requires them to answer questions
about a subject they potentially just learned about.
Because our research goal was to survey broad opinions
regarding the inspection of encrypted traffic, we preferred
not to limit our population to the small fraction of users
who are already aware of this issue. Instead, we chose to
accept the limitations related to instructing participants
about TLS proxies and survey as many participants as
possible. For our goals, this was preferable to ignoring the
opinions of a large portion of users.
To address the risks related to instructing participants on
an issue and then surveying them, we spent considerable
effort and time crafting our description of TLS proxies. Our
goals were to (1) give a simple and concise overview of how
TLS proxies are used to inspect encrypted traffic, and (2)
present participants with a fair and unbiased description of
how the inspection of encrypted traffic could be used for
both benevolent and malicious purposes.
In preparation for writing the description of TLS proxies,
we examined the literature and observed that existing
descriptions of TLS proxies were not neutral in tone and
would unduly bias participants. We talked with businesses
that sell proxies (i.e., Blue Coat, Symantec) and read
opinions from privacy advocates to better understand both
sides’ opinions. Based on the information in these sources,
we composed a draft of our description of TLS proxies,
focusing on using language that was informative and
neutral in tone, allowing participants to form their own
opinions. Our team of researchers, which included
members who are fundamentally opposed to TLS proxies
and members who accept their benevolent uses, iterated on
this description until all members were satisfied with its
wording.
We then tested this description using a convenience sample
of six individuals from our university who were not a part
of our research group to ensure it was balanced and
understandable. Based on feedback from the convenience
sample, we made minor edits to the description.
Finally, we tested this revised description using MTurk to
ensure that participants felt that the description was
sufficiently understandable. Of the 80 participants in this
pilot survey, nearly all participants (73; 91%) indicated
that the description of TLS proxies helped them
understand what TLS proxies are and how they are used (2
participants indicated the description was not helpful (2;
3%), with the remainder being undecided (5; 6%)). We
also examined participant responses to free response
questions and found that, as reported, most participants’
answers reflected an accurate understanding of TLS
proxies. As such, we included this version of the
description in both surveys, as shown in Figure 1.
3.2 Survey Contents
The survey begins by gathering demographic information.
It then instructs participants about TLS proxies and their
When you connect to the Internet you do so through
some organization’s network. For example, at home
you connect to your Internet service provider’s (ISP)
network, while at work you connect to your employer’s
network. To protect your information from others on
the network you can create secure connections to the
websites you use (HTTPS). This is done automatically
for you when you log into a website. The secure
connection encrypts your Internet traffic so that no one
else can view or modify your communication with the
website (see Figure A).
Figure A
The network you use to connect to the Internet can
also be set up to use a system called a TLS proxy. TLS
proxies sit in the middle of your secure connection to
the websites you view (see Figure B). At the TLS proxy
your Internet traffic is decrypted and the web proxy
can view and modify it. Afterwards, the TLS proxy
will then re-encrypt your traffic and forward it along.
This is done silently and without the knowledge of you
or the website you connect to.
Figure B
TLS proxies can be set up by the organization that
controls your Internet (for example, your ISP, school,
or employer) and also by malicious attackers. TLS
proxies have many different uses:
Protective Malicious
Blocking malware and viruses Stealing passwords
Protecting company secrets Identity theft
Blocking harmful websites Tracking government dissidents
Catching malicious individuals Spying (for example the NSA)
Censorship
Figure 1: TLS Proxy Description
use in the inspection of encrypted traffic. Next,
participants are asked to share their opinions regarding the
use of TLS proxies and the inspection of encrypted traffic.
These questions survey participant opinions as to whether
TLS proxies are a breach of their privacy and whether
there are acceptable uses for TLS proxies. Participants are
also asked their reasoning for why TLS proxies should or
should not be allowed. Also, participants are asked which
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parties they are concerned about using TLS proxies and
what, if any, measures should be used to regulate their use.
The survey then asks participants about how they would
personally react to having a TLS proxy on a network they
use to connect to the Internet. This section includes two
open-ended questions, the first asking them what concerns
they might have and the second asking them how it would
affect their opinion of the organization running the TLS
proxy. Finally, participants are given a chance to express
any remaining comments they might have.2
3.3 Survey Development
Before running our survey, we conducted a pilot survey
using MTurk to ensure that we would get meaningful and
thoughtful results. This pilot survey was IRB approved
and included 80 participants. Based on our analysis of
participants’ answers in this pilot survey, it was clear that
participants generally understood the description of TLS
proxies presented to them, and so we proceeded to launch
the full survey. Responses from the pilot survey are not
included in our results.
3.4 Qualitative Data Analysis
To better understand participants’ opinions regarding TLS
proxies and to avoid biasing their responses, we included
several open-ended questions in the survey. For each
question, we created a codebook to categorize participant
responses. One researcher reviewed all the participant
responses and created the initial codebooks. The
codebooks were then modified through discussion with the
coders.
After coding was completed, all of the coders met together
to discuss the data. As part of this discussion they were
encouraged to identify themes that they had seen in the
data. Particular attention was paid to the themes that they
felt the codebook did not adequately cover. Coders also
shared responses that they felt best represented the various
viewpoints expressed by participants.
In total, there were seven coders that analyzed the data. We
validated the consistency of the coders using Fleiss’ Kappa
[6]. Coders’ agreement ranged from “substantial agreement”
to “almost perfect agreement” (with kappa values ranging
from .687 to 1, mean of .865 and median of .833).
3.5 Amazon Mechanical Turk
We used Amazon Mechanical Turk (MTurk) to recruit
survey participants. MTurk has become an increasingly
popular method for gathering participant data for usability
studies and user surveys. Buhrmester et al. found that
MTurk participants are significantly more diverse than
typical American College samples and that data obtained
from MTurk studies is at least as reliable as those obtained
via more traditional methods [3]. Kittur et al. used MTurk
participants to classify Wikipedia entries and found that
that they could produce results equivalent to expert raters
[13]. While MTurk has known limitations, it is still a
mostly reliable platform for rapidly obtaining results
2As shown in the Appendix, questions are grouped onto
several pages. After questions on one page are answered
and the user continues with the survey, they are unable to
return and modify their answers.
related to user sentiment [26, 12].
3.6 Quality Control
To ensure participants provided valid data, we accepted
only participants that had previously completed 1,000
tasks on MTurk with an overall task approval rate of 95%
or higher. Second, the seven coders examined participants’
responses to open-ended questions in order to ensure that
participants had both understood the description of TLS
proxies and remained on topic. We validated the
consistency of the coders’ choice to exclude participants’
responses using Fleiss’ Kappa [6] and found that coders
were in perfect agreement (kappa value of 1). During the
coding process, a participant’s responses were discarded if
their answers were clearly spam (i.e., copying the text of a
Wikipedia page), or they did not understand the questions
being asked (i.e., their answers discussed HTTP proxies).
In total, we excluded 153 participants’ responses (12.1%)
as spam and 60 participants (4.8%) as misunderstandings.
The remaining 1,049 participants’ responses constitute the
results of our first survey.
3.7 Demographics
The demographics for the participants are shown in Table 1.
Most participants were from the United States (87%), with
the rest primarily from India (11.5%). Although results from
a previous paper suggested that MTurk participants from
India are less concerned with privacy [11], the results from
our first survey found that they were more likely to report
privacy concerns than their counterparts from the United
States of America (χ2[2, N = 1049] = 12.35, p < 0.01).
Participants were skewed towards males (61%), and ages
were centered around 25–32 (46%). Most participants were
single (60%) and had no children (62%). Nearly all
participants had completed high school, with the majority
having completed some level of higher education (57%).
Participants were asked to self-report their level of
knowledge of Internet security, with most rating
somewhere between somewhat knowledgeable and mildly
knowledgeable (78%).
After reading the description of TLS proxies, participants
were asked whether they had prior knowledge of TLS
proxies. Most participants reported having little to no
awareness of TLS proxies before the survey: unaware
(66.5%), unsure (8.1%), aware (25.4%). We speculate that
due to the effects of illusory superiority, the number of
participants that were unaware of TLS proxies before the
survey was even higher than reported [8, 9]. Additionally,
participants may have conflated knowledge of traditional
web proxies with knowledge of TLS proxies.
3.8 Limitations
In our survey, participant demographics were slightly
skewed towards a younger male population and nearly all
participants were from the US and India. Additional work
could be done to replicate our results with different
populations. Cross-cultural, international surveys would be
especially interesting, but these should be conducted by
researchers that can engage participants in their native
language and have an understanding of participants’
cultural perceptions.
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Survey 1
(N=1,049)
Survey 2
(N=927)
Country
United States 86.9% 94.3%
India 11.5% 5.7%
Other 0.3% N/A
Gender
Male 61.1% 60.6%
Female 38.6% 38.9%
Prefer not to answer 0.3% 0.4%
Age
18–24 years old 18.7% 17.8%
25–34 years old 47.0% 45.8%
35–44 years old 19.6% 21.8%
45–54 years old 8.6% 7.9%
55+ years old 5.8% 6.3%
Prefer not to answer 0.3% 0.4%
Relationship
Single 59.5% 60.9%
Married 35.5% 35.6%
Other 4.7% 2.7%
Prefer not to answer 0.6% 0.8%
Children
Yes 36.6% 32.5%
No 62.3% 67.2%
Prefer not to answer 0.9% 0.3%
Education
No diploma 1.0% 0.6%
High school 12.4% 11.0%
Some college or university credit 28.9% 29.3%
College or university degree 49.9% 50.5%
Post-Secondary Education 7.6% 8.4%
Prefer Not To Answer 0.2% 0.1%
Knowledge
No Knowledge 4.6% 2.6%
Somewhat Knowledgeable 35.7% 32.4%
Mildly Knowledgeable 42.4% 47.8%
Highly Knowledgeable 14.4% 15.2%
Expert 2.4% 1.8%
Prefer Not To Answer 0.2% 0.2%
Table 1: Participant Demographics
As shown in prior work, participants’ reported security
preferences and desires do not always align with their
actual behaviors [29]. Often users will report being more
privacy minded than they are in practice. Interestingly, in
our survey participants indicated a high level of acceptance
for TLS proxies, which could suggest that real-world
acceptance of TLS proxies is even higher than we
measured. On the other hand, many participants reported
wanting to have their consent obtained, or at least be
notified of, the inspection of encrypted traffic; in practice,
it is possible that fewer participants would actually be
interested in being notified.
Finally, while we spent considerable effort to craft a fair
and unbiased description of TLS proxies and the inspection
of encrypted traffic, there is still the possibility that it had
a significant effect on some participants’ responses. For
example, in the real world, users often learn about security
issues from the news, which is often sensational and biased.
In contrast, our description strove for neutrality, and as
such may have led to users taking a more rational view of
the inspection of encrypted traffic than would occur in the
wild. While we chose to accept these limitations in order
to obtain opinions from as many participants as possible,
an open avenue for future research is to find a way to
gather equally widespread opinions in a way that has fewer
limitations.
4. FIRST SURVEY – RESULTS
In this section we discuss the results of our survey in three
areas: acceptable uses for TLS proxies, general concerns
toward their use, and the reaction participants would have
if they discovered a network they use employed a TLS
proxy.
4.1 Acceptable Uses of TLS Proxies
Figure 2 shows participant attitudes toward proxies. A
somewhat surprising result is that participants largely
(752; 71.7%) felt that there were acceptable uses for TLS
proxies. This feeling prevailed even though nearly half of
the participants (522; 49.8%) indicated that TLS proxies
are an invasion of privacy, and only one-eighth of
participants (185; 17.6%) felt they presented no invasion of
privacy. There is a strong correlation between thinking
TLS proxies were an invasion of privacy and believing that
there were not acceptable uses for them
(χ2[4, N = 1049] = 141.50, p < 0.001). Nevertheless, over a
quarter of participants (297; 28.0%) felt that TLS proxies
were an invasion of privacy, but still had acceptable uses.
To better understand what uses might be acceptable, we
asked participants who felt there were acceptable uses to
enumerate those uses in an open-ended question. The
results from our coded responses are shown in the top part
of Table 2. The acceptable uses are largely concentrated on
three use cases:
1. Protecting organizations (493; 65.6%). Many
participants felt that organizations (e.g., businesses,
government agencies, schools, libraries) had a right to
protect their own intellectual property and security.
This included protecting the company from viruses
and hackers, filtering inappropriate or potentially
malicious websites, and preventing the leak of
sensitive information. Participants mentioned that
since these organizations provide the Internet for
their employees or constituents they had a right to
use TLS proxies on their own networks.
2. Protecting individuals (339; 45.1%).
Participants saw value in businesses using TLS
proxies to protect their customers. This protection
came in one of two forms:
• Direct. Antivirus applications and firewalls
could use TLS proxies to filter malware and
6
0% 10% 20% 30% 40% 50% 60% 70% 80% 90% 100%
There Should Be Legislation Addressing TLS Proxies
Browsers Should Notify Users of TLS Proxies
Concerned TLS Proxies Could Be Used by Governments
Concerned TLS Proxies Could Be Used by Hackers
There Are Acceptable Uses of TLS Proxies
TLS Proxies Are an Invasion of Privacy
Strongly Agree Agree Neither Agree nor Disagree Disagree Strongly Disagree
Figure 2: Participant Attitudes Toward TLS Proxies (N=1,049)
Opinion Participants
Acceptable Uses
Protect organizations 51.4% (n=539)
Protect individuals 34.8% (n=365)
Law enforcement and surveillance 8.9% (n=93)
Censor content 7.1% (n=75)
Never censor content 3.1% (n=32)
Acceptable at work, not at home 2.9% (n=30)
Concerns
Hackers and spying 60.5% (n=635)
Privacy and identity theft 55.4% (n=581)
Done without knowledge or consent 13.2% (n=138)
Reactions
Negative 60.8% (n=638)
Positive 5.0% (n=52)
Depends 34.2% (n=359)
Suspicious 25.8% (n=271)
Discontinue use 17.2% (n=180)
Change behavior (besides discontinue) 6.2% (n=65)
Table 2: Qualitative Response Categorization (N=1,049)
viruses. Similarly, ISPs could use TLS proxies to
detect and prevent phishing attackers and block
other inappropriate or malicious websites.
• Indirect. Participants recognized that they
have a significant amount of private information
stored externally on the web (e.g., at Amazon or
Google). In order to protect this data,
participants hoped that the companies storing
their private data would employ TLS proxies
internally to ensure the safety of the customer’s
data.
3. Law enforcement and surveillance (65; 8.6%).
Nearly a tenth of participants expressed that law
enforcement agencies should also be allowed to use
TLS proxies. This includes use by local or federal
agencies to track criminal or terrorist activity.
Several participants also expressed that while this
was a legitimate use it should only be done with a
valid warrant or if there was an imminent threat to
national security.
4.2 Concerns
Even though many participants in the first survey saw
acceptable uses for TLS proxies, they were not without
concerns or reservations. Based on our coding, we grouped
these concerns into the categories shown in the middle part
of Table 2. Three-quarters of the participants (795; 75.8%)
mentioned they worried about hackers and nearly as many
were concerned about the possibility for governmental
spying (743; 70.9%). There was also a strong correlation
between the concern that hackers could use TLS proxies
and that the government could use them
(χ2[4, N = 1049] = 194.57, p < 0.001).
The most visceral concerns were related to the breach of
privacy. One of the open response questions asked
participants to list what possible concerns they had
regarding the use of TLS proxies. Over half of participants
(581; 55.4%) mentioned they were concerned with a loss of
privacy and personal information. Nearly a tenth of
participants (104; 9.91%) mentioned having their identity
stolen, and even more participants had answers that
addressed the issue of identity theft generally.
A non-negligible number of the participants freely shared
that either they, a family member, or other acquaintance
had been the victim of account compromise. Similar to the
finding of Shay et al. [22] this was a traumatic experience
and it left participants especially concerned that TLS
proxies could be used to perpetrate identity theft. R208
shared,
“A major concern that I would have would be
the security of my personal and financial
information. I have many friends who have been
victims of identity theft and fraud, and would
hate to have to go through what they did.”
Participants were also concerned that TLS proxies could be
used without their knowledge. One-eighth of participants
(138; 13.2%) mentioned in the open response question that
they were concerned with privacy. Furthermore, when
directly asked about notification, an overwhelming
majority of participants (951; 90.7%) asserted they wanted
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to be notified by their browsers of the presence of TLS
proxies. Similarly, participants largely (942; 89.8%) felt
that there should be legislation concerning TLS proxies.
Most (782; 74.5%) wanted legislation to require
notification, and nearly as many (701; 66.8%) wanted
legislation to require consent.
4.3 Reactions
Participants in the first survey had varied responses on
how they would react to learning that they currently use a
network that employs TLS proxies. Based on our coding,
we grouped these concerns into the categories shown in the
bottom part of Table 2. Over half of participants (638;
60.8%) mentioned that it would negatively affect their
opinion of the owner of that network. For example, R77
stated,
“I would be angry and would feel that
organization violated my trust. I would wonder
what information that organization had been
collecting on me and what they planned to do
with it. If it was my employer, I also would
think that organization did not trust me and
would consider working somewhere else.”
Still, a third of participants (359; 34.2%) said that their
reaction would depend on who the owner of the network
was and how they were using the proxy. For example, if
the owner of the network was their employer they would
not have a negative reaction, but if it was their ISP or
government they would be very unhappy. Participants also
mentioned that their approval would rest on whether or
not any personal information was collected and/or sold and
whether their consent had first been obtained. R960
explained,
“It would be on a case by case basis. I can see
some instances where it would be understandable,
but if it was going on without my consent, I would
be wary of dealing with them in the future.”
Participants also mentioned ways in which their behavior
would change if they learned a network was employing a
TLS proxy. A quarter of participants (271; 25.8%) said
that it would make them suspicious of the owner of that
network. A quarter of participants (245; 23.4%) also
mentioned that they would change their behavior on that
network. For some participants (180; 17.2%) this included
discontinuing use of the network and its services, while
others (65; 6.2%) mentioned they would change the content
they looked at on the Internet or be more careful about
entering personal information, including but not limited to
e-commerce transactions. At the extreme, some
participants mentioned they would quit their job if they
found that their employer’s network used a TLS proxy. For
example, R127 expressed,
“If my employers were secretly spying on my
private data, I would sue them if legally
possible, and quit the job regardless.”
Persona Number Percent
Pragmatic majority 802 76.5%
Privacy fundamentalist 178 17.0%
Jaded 48 4.6%
Unconcerned 11 1.0%
Unclassified 10 1.0%
Table 3: Participant Persona Categorization (N=1,049)
4.4 Personas
As our research group discussed the answers to open
response questions in the first survey, it became clear that
the participants could generally be classified into one of
four personas: pragmatic, privacy fundamentalist, jaded,
and unconcerned. After recognizing this, two members of
the research group re-evaluated 90 participant responses
and categorized participants into one of these four
personas. The Fleiss’ Kappa for this classification was 1
(i.e., perfect agreement). One researcher then classified the
rest of the responses. The breakdown of participants into
these categories is given in Table 3.3
Even though three of these personas have similar names to
personas formulated by Westin [28], our categories are in
no way based on the research of Westin. Instead, our
methodology for creating personas more closely relates to
that of Woodruff et al. [29], i.e., analyzing how participants
indicate they would act in various privacy-related
situations in order to determine their persona. Moreover,
we do not intend these personas to be a definitive list of
privacy personas, but rather view them as a helpful way to
identify trends within our data.
4.4.1 Pragmatic Majority, N=802
The pragmatic majority weighed consumer benefits and
protections of public safety against costs of intrusive
practices, believed that organizations should earn the
public’s trust, and wanted to have the opportunity to
opt-out of intrusive practices. This group was strongly
correlated with being more likely to feel that there were
acceptable uses for TLS proxies (χ2[4, N = 1028] = 230.48,
p < 0.001). R93 stated,
“I think it is perfectly acceptable for
organizations (companies, schools, libraries,
etc.) to use TLS proxies because it protects
their computers. It keeps hackers from getting
to sensitive or confidential information of the
organization. In addition, it blocks harmful
viruses that can cause a lot of damage and
expense in repair. It can also keep individuals
from accessing websites (employees from playing
online games or minors from accessing
pornography). It is perfectly reasonable for
companies to employee[sic] this device for these
purposes when an individual is using their
computer. We should not expect privacy when
we are using someone else’s computer.”
3There were ten participants whose answers were vague
enough that we did not feel comfortable classifying them
as any of the personas.
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Though the pragmatic majority all weighed consumer
benefits versus intrusive practices, they were not uniform
in their conclusions about where and how TLS proxies
should be used. Some recognized the right of employers to
use them, while others believed they should only be
allowed in narrow cases such as with a warrant.
4.4.2 Privacy Fundamentalist, N=178
The privacy fundamentalist was generally distrustful of
organizations that ask for personal information, in favor of
legislation enhancing privacy, and chose privacy controls
over consumer benefits when a trade-off existed between
the two. These participants were strongly correlated with
being more likely to feel TLS proxies were an invasion of
privacy (χ2[4, N = 1028] = 114.81, p < 0.001). These
participants were also more likely to support legislation of
TLS proxies (χ2[2, N = 1028] = 14.40, p < 0.001).
The defining feature of the privacy fundamentalist was
that they viewed privacy as so important that it could not
be traded for any benefit, no matter how great. As
emphatically stated by R1119, “I believe privacy is
sacrosanct and one could argue that it’s a Constitutional
right.”
They were also likely to relate the use of TLS proxies to more
traditional methods of surveillance such as wiretapping and
intercepting mail.
4.4.3 Jaded, N=48
Jaded individuals were aware that violations of privacy
happen regularly, believed that governments conduct
surveillance on the general public, and had lost hope that
they can have privacy online. These participants felt that
“the system” was rigged to remove any real chance of them
having privacy. For example, R713 expressed,
“I know that it is my choice to use the internet;
however, since I live in a remote area with no
transportation to the nearest city (30 miles
away) I am ‘stuck’ working and banking and
doing business on the internet. I feel it is unfair
to be made to choose between being ‘safe’ and
having privacy freedom. I am especially
disgusted by our government’s spying behaviors
and the rhetoric about it being necessary for
national defense.”
Likewise, when asked about concerns regarding the use of
TLS proxies, R831 shared,
“None. The government (via the NSA) is already
reading everything we do and share online. So no
surprises there.”
Other jaded participants felt they had no choice in the
matter because in the United States Internet service
providers often have a monopoly.
4.4.4 Unconcerned, N=11
Unconcerned participants were generally trustful of
organizations that ask for personal information, willing to
sacrifice personal privacy to obtain consumer benefits, and
not in favor of legislation to protect or enhance privacy. In
our survey, we found very few unconcerned participants
(1%). It is possible that the recent news regarding
widespread government surveillance caused participants to
be more privacy aware and sensitive. In addition, our use
of qualitative data to classify participants allowed us to
recognize that participants were part of the pragmatic
majority even when their Likert responses might seem to
indicate otherwise.
5. SECOND SURVEY – METHODOLOGY
Our first survey revealed that participants’ opinions related
to TLS proxies were closely tied to the situation in which
TLS proxies were being used. To better clarify user feelings
in this area, we formulated a second survey in which we
ask participants about a series of specific scenarios where
inspection of encrypted traffic could be used. This second
survey serves to give quantitative backing to the qualitative
data gathered in the first survey.
We collected data for our second survey on Tuesday,
February 24, 2015 between 11:02 AM and 1:06 PM (PST).
Each participant could take the survey once and received
$1 USD as compensation upon completing the survey. The
survey begins exactly as the first survey by gathering
demographic information and then instructing participants
about TLS proxies and their uses, both benevolent and
malicious. Participants are then asked their opinions
regarding the use of TLS proxies in various circumstances.
In total 1,005 people completed the online survey. The
survey was also approved by our Institutional Review
Board and is contained in Appendix B.
5.1 Survey Description
The first portion of the second survey includes the same
description of TLS proxies as the first one. It then asks
several questions repeated from the first survey: whether
TLS proxies are an invasion of privacy and whether there
are acceptable uses for TLS proxies.
The main portion of this survey asks participants their
opinion regarding different situations where TLS proxies
may be used to inspect encrypted traffic, such as by an
employer, at a school, or a cafe´ with free WiFi. The full
list of scenarios is given in Figure 4. For each situation,
participants are asked whether the organization should be
allowed to run a TLS proxy, with responses taken from (1)
No, (2) Only if I consent, (3) Only if I am notified (consent
not required), (4) Yes (neither notification nor consent
required), or (5) Unsure. To choose the situations, we used
responses from open-ended questions in the first survey,
along with suggestions from our research team to fill out
the list. Finally, we had a single open-ended question
where participants could share any opinions they still had
remaining at the end of the survey.
We note that this survey had the same limitations as our
first survey.
5.2 Quality Control
To ensure participants provided valid data, we accepted
only participants that had previously completed 1,000
tasks on MTurk with an overall task approval rate of 95%
or higher. Second, we limited participants to the United
States and India. This was done because with the first
survey coders struggled to understand answers to free
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Figure 3: Participant Attitudes Toward TLS Proxies (Survey 1 – N=1,049, Survey 2 – N=927)
Survey 1
(N=1,049)
Survey 2
(N=927)
Prior Knowledge of TLS Proxies
Strongly Agree 4.1% 8.4%
Agree 21.3% 27.9%
Neither Agree nor Disagree 8.1% 13.2%
Disagree 48.1% 34.3%
Strongly Disagree 18.4% 16.2%
Table 4: Participants’ Knowledge of TLS Proxies
response questions from outside the United States and
India.4 Third, we looked at the single open-ended question
to determine if participants had entered spam (e.g., copied
an answer from Wikipedia). Finally, we used two
validation questions in the second survey because there
were not enough open responses to always distinguish
spam entries.
In total, we excluded 78 participant’s responses (7.8%). The
remaining 927 participant’s responses constitute the results
of our second survey.
5.3 Demographics
The demographics for the participants were summarized
earlier in Table 1. There were no significant differences in
the demographics of the first and second surveys.
6. SECOND SURVEY – RESULTS
In this section we discuss results from our second survey.
First we compare results from the three questions that
were the same between both surveys. We then discuss the
quantitative data regarding participants’ opinions
regarding different deployment scenarios for TLS proxies.
6.1 Comparison
In both surveys, after reading the description of TLS
proxies, participants were asked whether they had prior
knowledge of TLS proxies. These are shown in Table 4. In
the first survey, most participants reported having little to
no awareness of TLS proxies before the survey: aware
(25.4%), unsure (8.1%), unaware (66.5%). In the second
survey, more participants reported being aware of proxies
beforehand (the difference is statistically significant,
χ2[4, N = 1976] = 60.003, p < 0.001), though over half still
4Moreover, these represent a small enough portion of
participants that their responses had no significant effect
on the data.
reported having little to no awareness of TLS proxies
before the survey: unaware (50.5%), unsure (13.2%), aware
(36.3%).5
We also compared responses relating to whether
participants in both surveys felt that TLS proxies were an
invasion of privacy, and whether TLS proxies had
acceptable uses (see Figure 3). Participants in the second
survey were less likely to view TLS proxies as an invasion
of privacy (first survey – 50%, second survey – 35%), with
the difference being statistically significant
(χ2[4, N = 1976] = 54.228, p < 0.001). Similarly,
participants in the second survey were also more likely to
feel that there were acceptable uses for TLS proxies (first
survey – 72%, second survey – 85%), with this difference
also being statistically significant
(χ2[4, N = 1976] = 140.654, p < 0.001).
It is important to note that in both surveys, after
participants answered each group of questions (see
Appendix) participants were unable to return to earlier
groups of questions and alter their answers. As such, the
above reported differences are not due to differences in the
survey, as up to this point the surveys were identical.
6.2 Scenarios
We asked participants regarding their opinions towards the
inspection of encrypted traffic in specific scenarios. For
each scenario, participants indicate whether they were
comfortable with the traffic being intercepted (“Yes”),
whether they wanted to be notified (“Notified”), whether
they wanted their consent to be obtained (“Consent”), or
whether they were uncomfortable with it. The results for
these questions are summarized in Figure 4.
Participants in our second survey are generally willing to
accept the use of TLS proxies in most situations, with
acceptance ranging from 65% to 90% of participants, when
summing together those who accept it, those who desire
notification, and those who desire both notification and
consent. For both employers (when you use your own
computer) and elementary schools, the support for using
TLS proxies without notification or consent from users is
surprisingly strong (455; 49.1% and 434; 46.8%). This may
be due to a belief in employer rights in the first case and a
desire to protect children in the second case. In both cases
there is still strong support for either notification or
5As before, we speculate that due to the effects of illusory
superiority, the number of participants that were unaware of
TLS proxies before the survey was even higher than reported
[8, 9].
10
0% 10% 20% 30% 40% 50% 60% 70% 80% 90% 100%
Your Government Monitoring Your Internet Traffic
Your ISP
Paid WiFi
Your Employer When You Use Your Own Device
Free WiFi -- Airport, Hotel, Cafe, Etc.
Software You Installed to Protect Your Computer
University
Public Library
Elementary School
Your Employer When You Use a Company Computer
Yes Notified Consent No Unsure
Figure 4: Participant Responses on Scenarios—Should the Organization Be Allowed To Run a TLS Proxy? (N=927)
consent (419; 45.2% and 377; 40.7%).
The strongest objections to any kind of TLS proxy are for
government monitoring (437; 47.1%), using your own device
at work (297; 32.0%), or using your own ISP (271; 29.2%).
Note these latter two map to situations where the user has
paid for the device or for network access. Users have stronger
objections to TLS proxies when they pay for network access
through a home ISP than when they pay for WiFi when they
are away from home.
When examining the differences among opinions for
notification versus consent, we see that the preference for
consent is higher for personal firewalls (software you
installed to protect your computer), your ISP, free WiFi,
paid WiFi, and using your own device at work. The
preference is higher for notification for a public library,
university, elementary school, and using a company
computer at work. This seems to be a clear split that
favors consent in cases where the user feels in control
versus notification when an organization is in control. The
strongest support for consent is with a personal firewall
(385; 41.5%), your ISP (375; 40.5%), and paid WiFi (358;
38.6%).
7. DISCUSSION
In this section we discuss interesting themes we saw as we
analyzed participants’ responses to the open-ended
questions.
7.1 Informed Participants
Most of the participants showed a high level of engagement
in the survey. At the end of the survey when asked if they
had any additional comments, a large number of
participants mentioned that they were thankful that we
had informed them of this information. Some even asked
where they could get more information on the topic of TLS
proxies. Additionally, we were impressed with the in-depth
analysis of trade-offs that many users shared, which often
went far beyond the scope of any information provided to
them in the survey.
Participants clearly understood that there were trade-offs
involved with the use of TLS proxies and the inspection of
encrypted traffic, weighing the benevolent uses for schools
or workplaces and the danger of misuse by insiders or by
hackers. As they struggled with this trade-off, participant
responses indicated confusion, doubt, worry, equivocation,
and reasoned conclusions. Confusion regarding how to
resolve the conflict was evident when participants labeled
it a “grey area.” R988 considered both good and bad uses
and worried, “How are you supposed to know which is
happening?”
Some participants weighed the trade-offs and resolved the
dilemma by deciding that proxies should only be used by
consent. For example, R827 expressed:
“I believe that TLS proxies are an invasion of
privacy, as is anything that monitors my
internet usage without my permission. However
if you are using someone else’s (like a
company’s) network, they have every right to
make the rules of use... This is one of those
doubled-edged swords – it can be used for your
good and security and it can be used to harm
and spy on you. Because of the distinct
possibility of lost privacy, this type of proxy
should [not be] used, except by your agreement,
not by anyone else.”
Others wanted companies or schools to be able to use TLS
proxies for security purposes, but also wanted to prevent
them from being used for government surveillance or by
hackers. Still others felt TLS proxies should only be used
by the government to catch terrorists or criminals.
Similarly, of the participants who were against the use of
TLS proxies, the reasons for opposing TLS proxies were not
amorphous, but concrete and rational. For example, R666
stated:
“I think TLS proxies don’t sound very safe
because it sounds like an invasion of privacy. I
don’t think organizations should be able to
decrypt your internet traffic and modify it and
re-encrypt it. Perhaps they are just trying to
protect against viruses and the like but it doesn’t
sound safe for the person using the internet.
What if this technology was misused? Someone
could get [h]old of your financial information
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for example. It sounds to[o] risky. I wouldn’t
want to buy something online and risk someone
having access to my credit card number.”
7.2 Notification and Consent
Numerous participants expressed a desire for notification
and consent when TLS proxies were being used on a
network. A typical response as given by R413 was,
“Well for some things it would be understandable,
I’d just like to be informed so I know the risk I’m
taking.”
R313 expressed,
“If I encrypt something no one has the right to
unencrypt it unless I give them the right to -
simple as that.”
Participants expressed extreme distrust for those who would
use TLS proxies without informing users, going so far as to
say they “would hate them,” “would wonder what they are
looking for,” and “would assume they were up to no good.”
Others stated they would change their behavior if notified
about a proxy, such as avoiding commercial transactions,
using a VPN to circumvent a proxy, or self-censorship of
their Google searches and other online communication.
7.3 Jaded Participants
We were surprised to find that 4.5% of participants were
“jaded” towards the current state of privacy online. They
felt that currently it is largely impossible to have any
expectation of privacy or security. Many felt that the
government was already spying on the population at large,
and that even without TLS proxies the government could
find a way to gain access to their private information.
Others felt that even if they discovered that their traffic
was being intercepted, they would have no recourse as their
access to the Internet is controlled by a monopoly.
We find this group concerning, as this is not a group of
individuals unconcerned with security and privacy. Rather
they are a group that still cares about privacy, but has lost
all hope that they can actually achieve digital privacy. This
is a troubling trend, as such individuals are unlikely to adopt
solutions that could actually benefit them. As such, work
needs to be done to determine how this type of user’s trust
can be regained.
7.4 Changing Opinions
Between our two surveys, we noticed differences in the way
participants viewed TLS proxies. This demonstrates that
users’ perceptions towards security and privacy are not
static. As such, it is important that work such as this be
done on a regular basis, helping the security community
stay abreast of current opinions and attitudes.
One interesting difference is that in the second survey
fewer participants viewed inspection of encrypted traffic as
an invasion of privacy, and more participants felt that
there were acceptable uses for this practice. One possible
explanation for this difference is that news stories have
been discussing how encryption and other privacy
preserving technologies could be used by terrorist
organizations. Still, additional research is needed to better
understand this shift in attitudes towards security and
privacy.
8. CONCLUSION
This paper presents the first survey of general (i.e.,
non-expert) user attitudes toward TLS proxies. Responses
indicate that participants hold nuanced opinions on
security and privacy trade-offs, with most recognizing
legitimate uses for the proxies, but concerned about
threats from hackers or government surveillance. A
significant concern about malicious uses of TLS inspection
is identity theft, and many would react negatively and
some would change their behavior if they discovered
inspection occurring without their knowledge. We also find
that a small but significant number of participants are
jaded by the current state of affairs and have lost any
expectation of privacy.
User attitudes toward TLS proxies provide an important
data point along the spectrum of discussion that is
currently taking place regarding who should have access to
encrypted information. The results of our survey
demonstrate that participants were generally aware of the
trade-offs between privacy and security, and that most
participants were willing to sacrifice some privacy for
additional security. Nevertheless, participants strongly
supported notification and consent for when encrypted
traffic is being inspected.
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APPENDIX
A. FIRST SURVEY
A.1 Page 1
We are conducting an academic research survey about
public opinions on Internet security. The survey will take
approximately 5 minutes.
We will not collect any personally identifying information. If
you do not complete the survey we will not store any of your
responses. If you have any questions or concerns about the
information collected, please contact us at [email redacted].
A.2 Page 2
What is your gender?
◦ Male
◦ Female
◦ I prefer not to answer
What is your age?
◦ 18 – 24 years old
◦ 25 – 34 years old
◦ 35 – 44 years old
◦ 45 – 54 years old
◦ 55 years or older
◦ I prefer not to answer
What is the highest degree or level of school you
have completed?
◦ Some school, no high school diploma
◦ High school graduate, diploma or the equivalent (for
example: GED)
◦ Some college or university credit, no degree
◦ College or university degree
◦ Post-secondary education
◦ I prefer not to answer
What is your marital status?
◦ Married
◦ Single
◦ Other
◦ I prefer not to answer
Do you have children?
◦ Yes
◦ No
◦ I prefer not to answer
In which country do you reside?
A.3 Page 3
Where are taking this survey?
◦ Home
◦ Work
◦ School
◦ Library
◦ Retail (coffee shop, internet cafe, etc.)
◦ Other
◦ I prefer not to answer
What type of Internet connection are you using?
◦ Wired
◦ WiFi
◦ Cellular (3G, 4G, etc.)
◦ Other
◦ I don’t know
◦ I prefer not to answer
How knowledgeable are you about Internet security?
◦ Expert
◦ Highly knowledgeable
◦ Mildly knowledgeable
◦ Somewhat knowledgeable
◦ No Knowledge
◦ I prefer not to answer
When connecting to a website securely, for example
when doing online shopping or banking, who should
be able to see the contents of your Internet traffic?
(Choose all that apply)
◦ Me
◦ My Internet provider
◦ The website
◦ Malicious individuals
◦ Everyone
A.4 Page 4
When you connect to the Internet you do so through some
organization’s network. For example, at home you connect
to your Internet service provider’s (ISP) network, while at
work you connect to your employer’s network. To protect
your information from others on the network you can
create secure connections to the websites you use
(HTTPS). This is done automatically for you when you log
into a website. The secure connection encrypts your
Internet traffic so that no one else can view or modify your
communication with the website (see Figure A).
Figure A
The network you use to connect to the Internet can also be
set up to use a system called a TLS proxy. TLS proxies sit
in the middle of your secure connection to the websites you
view (see Figure B). At the TLS proxy your Internet traffic
is decrypted and the web proxy can view and modify it.
Afterwards, the TLS proxy will then re-encrypt your traffic
and forward it along. This is done silently and without the
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knowledge of you or the website you connect to.
Figure B
TLS proxies can be set up by the organization that
controls your Internet (for example, your ISP, school, or
employer) and also by malicious attackers. TLS proxies
have many different uses:
Protective Malicious
Blocking malware and viruses Stealing passwords
Protecting company secrets Identity theft
Blocking harmful websites Tracking government dissidents
Catching malicious individuals Spying (for example the NSA)
Censorship
Strongly Disagree, Disagree, Neither Agree nor
Disagree, Agree, Strongly Agree
◦ The above description of TLS proxies helped me to clearly
understand what TLS proxies are and how they are used.
A.5 Page 5
Strongly Disagree, Disagree, Neither Agree nor
Disagree, Agree, Strongly Agree
◦ Prior to taking this survey, I was aware that organizations
were using TLS proxies.
◦ TLS proxies are an invasion of privacy.
◦ There are acceptable uses for TLS proxies.
Only seen if selected "Agree" or "Strongly Agree"
to acceptable uses for TLS proxies.
Please explain which organizations should be
allowed to use TLS proxies and for what purpose.
(only shown on an Agree or Strongly Agree answer from
above)
Only seen if selected "Disagree" or "Strongly
Disagree" to acceptable uses for TLS proxies.
Please explain why TLS proxies should never be
allowed.
A.6 Page 6
Strongly Disagree, Disagree, Neither Agree nor
Disagree, Agree, Strongly Agree
◦ I am concerned that TLS proxies could be used by hackers
to compromise my Internet security.
◦ I am concerned that TLS proxies could be used by the
government to collect my personal information.
◦ Browsers should notify users if there is a TLS proxy
intercepting and decrypting their Internet traffic.
◦ There should be legislation that addresses TLS proxies.
Only seen if selected "Agree" or "Strongly Agree"
to legislation that addresses proxies.
What should legislation that addresses TLS proxies
do? (Choose all that apply)
◦ Prevent their use
◦ Require organizations to obtain consent before using a
TLS proxy
◦ Require organizations to inform users when a TLS proxy
is being used
◦ I don’t believe that legislation is required
◦ Other
A.7 Page 7
The following statements and questions are about how you
would personally react to having a TLS proxy on a
network you use to connect to the Internet.
Strongly Disagree, Disagree, Neither Agree nor
Disagree, Agree, Strongly Agree
◦ I believe TLS proxies are in use on a network I use to
connect to the Internet.
Please explain what concerns you have about a
TLS proxy being used on a network you personally
use to connect to the Internet.
Please explain how it would change your opinion of
an organization if you discovered that they were
using a TLS proxy.
If you have any other thoughts, please share them
with us below:
B. SECOND SURVEY
B.1 Page One
What is your gender?
◦ Male
◦ Female
◦ I prefer not to answer
What is your age?
◦ 18 – 24 years old
◦ 25 – 34 years old
◦ 35 – 44 years old
◦ 45 – 54 years old
◦ 55 years or older
◦ I prefer not to answer
What is the highest degree or level of school you
have completed?
◦ Some school, no high school diploma
◦ High school graduate, diploma or the equivalent (for
example: GED)
◦ Some college or university credit, no degree
◦ College or university degree
◦ Post-secondary education
◦ I prefer not to answer
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What is your marital status?
◦ Married
◦ Single
◦ Other
◦ I prefer not to answer
Do you have children?
◦ Yes
◦ No
◦ I prefer not to answer
In which country do you reside?
◦ United States
◦ India
◦ Other
How knowledgeable are you about Internet security?
◦ Expert
◦ Highly knowledgeable
◦ Mildly knowledgeable
◦ Somewhat knowledgeable
◦ No Knowledge
◦ I prefer not to answer
B.2 Page 2
When you connect to the Internet you do so through some
organization’s network. For example, at home you connect
to your Internet service provider’s (ISP) network, while at
work you connect to your employer’s network. To protect
your information from others on the network you can
create secure connections to the websites you use
(HTTPS). This is done automatically for you when you log
into a website. The secure connection encrypts your
Internet traffic so that no one else can view or modify your
communication with the website (see Figure A).
Figure A
The network you use to connect to the Internet can also be
set up to use a system called a TLS proxy. TLS proxies sit
in the middle of your secure connection to the websites you
view (see Figure B). At the TLS proxy your Internet traffic
is decrypted and the web proxy can view and modify it.
Afterwards, the TLS proxy will then re-encrypt your traffic
and forward it along. This is done silently and without the
knowledge of you or the website you connect to.
Figure B
TLS proxies can be set up by the organization that
controls your Internet (for example, your ISP, school, or
employer) and also by malicious attackers. TLS proxies
have many different uses:
Protective Malicious
Blocking malware and viruses Stealing passwords
Protecting company secrets Identity theft
Blocking harmful websites Tracking government dissidents
Catching malicious individuals Spying (for example the NSA)
Censorship
Ordering of questions randomized.
Strongly Disagree, Disagree, Neither Agree nor
Disagree, Agree, Strongly Agree
◦ The above description of TLS proxies helped me to clearly
understand what TLS proxies are and how they are used.
◦ Stealing passwords and identity theft are in the list of
malicious uses shown above.
◦ Blocking malware and viruses are in the list of malicious
uses shown above.
◦ Prior to taking this survey, I was aware that organizations
were using TLS proxies.
◦ TLS proxies are an invasion of privacy.
◦ There are acceptable uses for TLS proxies.
B.3 Page 3
For each scenario listed below, provide your opinion on
whether or not the organization should be allowed to run a
TLS proxy.
Ordering of questions randomized.
No, Only if I consent, Only if I am notified
(consent not required), Yes (Neither notification
nor consent required), Unsure
◦ Your employer when you use a company computer
◦ Your employer when using your own device (cell phone,
tablet, laptop)
◦ Elementary school
◦ Public Library
◦ University
◦ Paid WiFi – Airport, Hotel, Cafe, etc.
◦ Free WiFi – Airport, Hotel, Cafe, etc.
◦ The company that provides Internet access at your home
◦ Personal firewall – software that you have installed to
protect your computer
◦ Your government monitoring your Internet traffic
B.4 Page 4
Please feel free to write any thoughts you have on
the subject of TLS proxies. We will use this
information to help guide future research.
(Optional)
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